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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND MATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from pretrial orders in a 
capital homicide case filed in the First District Court for Cache 
County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-35-26 (2) (c) (1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts is set forth in Appellant1s Brief and 
is not restated at this time. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Evidence of Defendant's California conviction of false 
imprisonment which would be inadmissible for impeachment purposes 
pursuant to Rule 609(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence should also 
be inadmissible as an aggravating circumstance charged under Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 76-5-202(1)(h) (1953, as amended). See Utah R. 
Evid. 609(b). 
2. Defendant is entitled to a change of venue because of 
the conduct of the State in releasing information to the news 
Case No. 8 7 0306 
Priority 1 
1 
media which was designed to prejudice the community against the 
Defendant. The magnitude and nature of the pre-trial publicity, 
together with the prejudicial reports themselves and the 
emotional involvement of the community itself, require that venue 
be transferred from Cache County. 
2. The issue of the denial of a survey of potential jurors 




THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE CHARGED UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN, SEC. 76-5-202(1)(h) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND WILL DENY DEFENDANT HIS 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
The State in the Respondent's brief ignores the proscription 
of State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) which considered 
the admissibility of a witness1 prior conviction for purposes of 
impeachment. Admittedly, Banner examined the admissibility of a 
prior conviction for purposes of impeachment. Nevertheless, the 
Appellant submits that the logic of Banner applies with equal 
force where the prior conviction is offered as to the merits of 
the case. This is particularly true where Banner would preclude 
the admission of Appellant's California conviction. The 
Defendant submits that the California conviction which the State 
arguably seeks to introduce as an aggravating circumstance in the 
capital homicide prosecution would be inadmissible on any grounds 
other than arguably as an aggravating circumstance to enhance a 
homicide conviction. 
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Rule 609(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence renders the 
California conviction inadmissible because more than ten years 
have elapsed since the date of the California conviction. 
Similarly, Rules 403, 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
specifically exclude the admission of the California conviction, 
POINT II 
THE CONDUCT OF THE STATE, IN RELEASING TO THE 
NEWS MEDIA INFORMATION DESIGNED TO PREJUDICE 
THE COMMU2IITY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, WHEN 
CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH THE PREJUDICIAL 
REPORTS THEMSELVES, AND IN LIGHT OF THE 
EMOTIOIIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY IN 
DEFENDANT'S SITUATION, ENTITLE THE DEFENDANT 
TO A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
The test proposed by the State for determining whether a 
motion for a change of venue should have been granted, namely 
that Defendant show that the prejudicial material actually 
prejudiced the jury that is eventually selected to hear the case, 
should not be applied in this case where there has been 
prejudicial publicity that has been disseminated in the 
community, exacerbated by state complicity, the test should be 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that jury prejudice will 
prevent a fair trial. 
The cases cited by the State in support of the harsher rule 
all involve situations where there was no showing of biased news 
coverage and little or no abuses committed by state officers and 
officials in generating the coverage. This Courtf in 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), stated: 
Defendant nowhere asserts that the nev/s 
reports were biased, that the prosecution 
leaked items to the press, that there were 
editorial comments demanding conviction to 
3 
assuage public outrage, or that defendant was 
otherwise the subject of a trial by the news 
media. Moreover, there were not the abuses 
committed by state officers and officials 
which so characterize Sheppard, Cstes and 
Rideau, all supra. * In short, this is not one 
of those exceptional cases where pretrial 
publicity exacerbated by State complicity 
encouraged the jurors to form such strong 
preconceived views of the defendant's guilt 
as to be considered inherently prejudicial 
against him. 
at p. 1349. 
Likewise, the case of Northern California Pharmaceutical 
Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1962), quoted in 
State v. Woody 648 P.2d 71, 39 (Utah 1932), and cited by the 
state in support of the more restrictive rule, involved reported 
remarks by the trial judge, accompanied by "innocuous 
commenting." 
During the course of that hearing, the 
judge in giving reasons against any further 
delay in going to trial said: 
"If the charges or the allegations made 
by the Government in this indictment are 
true, it means that every person who has ever 
paid for a prescription drug during the 
period which is within the statute of 
limitations has a treble-damage anti-trust 
action." 
These remarks, accompanied by innocuous 
commentary, were carried by four Bay Area 
newspapers in editions which appeared 
immediately after the hearing. The articles 
were not remotely inflammatory and one 
undertook to challenge the court's views on 
the question of private suits. 
Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n at page 383. 
The case of Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) 
cited by the state, apparently involved a couple of newspaper 
articles. The court observed: 
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Significantly, neither the examples of 
newspaper publicity attached to the affidavit 
nor anything else in the record supports the 
charge of actual prejudice from news 
reporting. 
at p. 1111. There was no allegation or evidence of improper 
conduct by state officials. 
The test proposed by the state should be followed only if 
the evidence is insufficient to support a motion for the change 
of venue under the first test - whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that jury prejudice will prevent a fair trial. This 
two step process appears to have been followed in the recent case 
of State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1983) where the Court, 
referring back to State v. Pierre, stated: 
After reviewing the record, we hold 
without reservation that the publicity and 
attendant circumstances in this case did not 
amount to "one of those exceptional cases 
where pretrial publicity exacerbated by State 
complicity encouraged the jurors to form such 
strong preconceived views of the defendant's 
guilt as to be considered inherently 
prejudicial against him." State v. Pierre, 
at 1349. 
at page 19. The court's language regarding "strong preconceived 
ideas" and "inherently prejudicial" appears to essentially follow 
the constitutional test of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 334 U.S. 333, 362 
(1966) of whether there is a reasonable likelihood that jury 
prejudice will prevent a fair trial, with the additional 
recognition that the State's conduct in generating adverse 
pretrial publicity is going to be a significant factor. 
The Bishop opinion, having found that the evidence did not 
satisfy the first test, then went on to the second, of 
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determining whether there was actual prejudice by pretrial 
publicity. 
Because we hold that pretrial publicity 
and community sentiment did not inevitably 
lead to an unfair trial, defendant may 
prevail on his point only if he demonstrates 
that the trial was not fundamentally fair. 
We begin with the proposition that whether a 
motion for a change of venue should be 
granted rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court. The standard used to 
determine if an abuse of discretion has 
resulted is whether the defendant has had "a 
panel of impartial, xindifferent' jurors! . . 
. T h u s , defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating the existence of actual 
prejudice on his appeal. 
The Defendant asserts that his is one of those cases where, 
looking at the "totality of the circumstances" as required by 
Pierre, at page 1350, and paying particular attention to the role 
of state officials in generating prejudicial publicity, the 
publicity did encourage jurors to form such strong preconceived 
views of the defendant's guilt as to be considered inherently 
prejudicial against him. 
The Respondent makes no answer to the inexcusable behavior 
of the lav; enforcement officials in providing the following to 
the news media (Cites in Brief of Appellant): 
1. That the victim's mother had taken and passed a 
polygraph test with "flying colors" but the Defendant had 
twice refused to take one; 
2. That he had become uncooperative with the police; 
3. That he was refusing to answer questions about 
possible new leads and becoming hostile; 
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4. That police want answers from Defendant; 
5. That the police were suspicious of the Defendant; 
6. That the police asked Defendant "point blank" to 
confess to the crime; 
7. That he was always their key suspect; 
8. That he threatened to kill one of the detectives; 
9. That he had a criminal record including a 
California kidnaping where he abducted a woman at 
knifepoint; 
10. That he had "possible involvement in a California 
child abuse case where the infant in that case reportedly 
sustained severe injuries;" 
11. That he had an "extensive criminal record" 
including "convictions for previous violent offenses;" 
12. That there was "confirmation from California 
officials that James fled the state while on parole; 
13. The evils complained of in this case are the same 
that were addressed in the Discipline Corner of the Utah 
Bar Letter of March, 1988. Trial attorneys, particularly in 
the area of criminal prosecution or defense v/ere referred 
to Rule 3.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its 
predecessor DR 7-107 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 3.6 (1983) and Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility DR 7-107. While there is no evidence that 
the County Attorney himself or any of the attorneys in his 
office were was providing this information to the news 
media, and the content and context indicate the information 
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was emana t ing from t h e p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t o r s , t h e s e r u l e s 
shou ld not be p e r m i t t e d t o bo s u b v e r t e d b e c a u s e of l ax 
s u p e r v i s i o n of law en fo rcemen t o f f i c i a l s d u r i n g t h e 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r o s e c u t i o n of c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s . DR 7-
107 , in e f f e c t d u r i n g the t ime of t h e compla ined of 
a c t i v i t y , r ead as f o l l o w s : 
(A) A lawyer p a r t i c i p a t i n g in or a s s o c i a t e d 
wi th t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a c r i m i n a l m a t t e r 
s h a l l n o t make o r p a r t i c i p a t e in mak ing an 
e x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e 
p e r s o n would e x p e c t t o be d i s s e m i n a t e d by 
means of p u b l i c communica t ion and t h a t does 
more than s t a t e w i t h o u t e l a b o r a t i o n : 
(1) I n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d in a p u b l i c 
r e c o r d . 
( 2 ) T h a t t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s i n 
p r o g r e s s . 
( 3 ) T h e g e n e r a l s c o p e o f t h e 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n c l u d i n g a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e 
o f f e n s e a n d , i f p e r m i t t e d b y l a w , t h e 
i d e n t i t y of t h e v i c t i m . 
( 4 ) A r e q u e s t f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n 
a p p r e h e n d i n g a s u s p e c t or a s s i s t a n c e in o t h e r 
m a t t e r s a n d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n n e c e s s a r y 
t h e r e t o . 
(5 ) A w a r n i n g t o t h e p u b l i c of a n y 
d a n g e r s . 
(B) A lawyer or law f i rm a s s o c i a t e d wi th t h e 
p r o s e c u t i o n or d e f e n s e of a c r i m i n a l m a t t e r 
s h a l l n o t , from t h e t ime of t h e f i l i n g of a 
c o m p l a i n t , i n f o r m a t i o n , or i n d i c t m e n t , t h e 
i s s u a n c e of an a r r e s t w a r r a n t , o r a r r e s t 
u n t i l t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of t h e t r i a l , o r 
d i s p o s i t i o n o f w i t h o u t t r i a l , m a k e o r 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n m a k i n g an e x t r a j u d i c i a l 
s t a t e m e n t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n would 
e x p e c t t o be d i s s e m i n a t e d by means of p u b l i c 
communica t ion and t h a t r e l a t e s t o : 
(1) The c h a r a c t e r , r e p u t a t i o n , or p r i o r 
c r i m i n a l r e c o r d ( i n c l u d i n g a r r e s t s , 
i n d i c t m e n t s , o r o t h e r c h a r g e s of c r i m e ) of 
t h e a c c u s e d . 
(2) The p o s s i b i l i t y of a p l e a of g u i l t y 
t o t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d o r t o a l e s s e r 
o f f e n s e . 
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(2) The existence or contents of any 
confession, admission, or statement given by 
the accused or his refusal or failure to make 
a statement. 
(4) The performance or results of any 
examinations or tests or the refusal or 
failure of the accused to submit to 
examinations or tests. 
(5) The identity, testimony, or 
credibility of a prospective witness. 
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused, the evidence, or 
the merits of the case. 
As is readily apparent, all the reported information 
complained of was in violation of these standards contained 
in the Code of Professional Responsibility and is clearly of 
a nature which would encourage jurors to form such strong 
preconceived views ot the Defendants' guilt as to be 
considered inherently prejudicial. Whether such conduct 
would be inherently prejudicial in a large metropolitan 
community such as Salt Lake County might be debatable. But 
law enforcement officials1 injection of this information 
into the tight-knit homogeneous community of Logan where the 
whole town was taking the baby's disappearance very 
personally with extensive participation in the search is 
designed for and can have only one purpose and effect, 
encouraging the community, including potential jurors to 
form strong preconceived ideas of the Defendant's guilt. 
POINT III 
THE ISSUE OF THE DENIAL OF A SURVEY OF 
POTENTIAL JURORS IS INTIMATELY RELATED TO THE 
ISSUE OF VENUE AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. 
The Defendant agrees with the State that the Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal did not specifically raise this issue. 
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However, because it is intimately related to the issue of venue, 
it should be considered. 
A formal motion was filed and was ruled on in court on June 
18, 1987. An order denying the motion was signed on November 6, 
1987 and attached to the docketing statement. A copy is attached 
as Exhibit 1. Thereafter, at the request of the county attorney, 
another hearing was held in which the court indicated that 
because the matter was on appeal, he wasn't sure he had authority 
to sign the appeal. However, counsel knows of no written order 
entered rescinding the order of November 6, 1987. 
CONCLUSION 
The admission of a 15 year old conviction which is totally 
unrelated to the conduct for which the Defendant stands accused 
will result in prejudice against the Defendant. The conviction 
would be inadmissible under any of the rules of evidence 
promulgated by this Court. To permit the jury to hear proof 
concerning a California felony conviction will divert the jury's 
attention from the homicide charge and will likely result in 
Defendant's being found guilty without regard to the weight of 
evidence in the homicide case. 
The pervasive adverse publicity associated with the 
disappearance of the James infant, the resultant efforts to 
locate the kidnaped child, the investigation which culminated in 
the arrest of the Defendant, and the pre-trial publicity 
attendant to this case have created an atmosphere in Cache 
County, Utah, which make it virtually impossible to impanel a 
fair and impartial jury in Cache County. The District Court 
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should have granted the Defendant's motion to transfer the trial, 
and likewise, should have granted his motion to survey potential 
jurors as to their attitudes in an effort to determine bias and 
prejudice in advance of having to select from a potential venire 
or to adjudicate the motion for change of trial, 
DATED this /^ day of June, 1988. 
Robert W. Gutke 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
• / - f - - ' ~%Jf 
Mauhan Hul t 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to 
counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent, David L. Wilkinson, 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this 1^ day of June, 1988. 
L^^-U-^A- tAj-X^t^^C^ 
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IN' THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ! 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, ! 
Defendant. • ' 
» AMENDED ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR TRANSFER OF TRIAL AND 
l DENYING MOTION FOR ORDER 
AUTHORIZING SURVEY OF 
> POTENTIAL JURORS 
• Case No. 3547 
The above entitle matter came before the above entitled 
court on the 18th day of June, 1987, upon Defendant's Motions for 
Transfer of Trial and for Order Authorizing Survey of Potential 
Jurors, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen presiding. The 
Plaintiff was represented by Jeff "R" Burbank and James C. 
Jenkins. The Defendant was present and represented by Nathan D. 
Hult. The court examined the pleadings on file and after having 
heard the evidence presented by the parties, made and entered the 
following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motions for Transfer 
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